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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
IRENE PAUL and CHARLES J. PAUL,
Plaintiffs and Respondents
vs.
WOODROW LAWRENCE KIRKENDALL, JOHN
DOE, JANE DOE AND JOHN DOE, COMPANY,
Defendants,
and
MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, a corporation
Garnishee and Appellant

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from an interlocutory order denying Appellant's motion for summary judgment, which
order was entered by the Second District Court for
Weber County, Honorable John F. Wahlquist, Judge,
presiding. Plaintiffs in the court below will be here
referred to as such, the defendant Kirkendall as the
defendant, and the Appellant Maryland Casualty Company, as the Garnishee.
Plaintiffs and Respondents herein recovered a judgSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ment entered upon a jury verdict against defendant
Kirkendall in the sum of Twenty Thousand ($20,000.00)
Dollars, for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident. This judgment was affirmed on appeal
to this court 1 U. 2nd 1; 261 P. 2nd 670
Garnishee, the Appellant herein, as defendant's insurance carrier, paid said judgment up to the limits of
its policy coverage of Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars, together with interest.
Plaintiffs, after 'execution returned unsatisfied,
sued out a writ of garnishment with interrogatories,
which was served on appellant, ~Iaryland Casualty Company, as Garnishee. It was therein asked, among other
things, if Garnishee was indebted to defendant. The
answer was negative. Plaintiff then replied to the
Answers alleging that Garnishee was indebted in the
amount of the excess judgment, based upon the assertion affirmatively pleaded in plaintiffs' second reply,
in substance, that Garnishee negligently and in bad
faith failed to settle the case within the policy limits
before trial, after having an opportunity to do so.
Upon the issues fran1ed by interrogatories and
reply, both sides moved for sum1nary judgment, which
motions were taken under advise1nent by the Court at
pre-trial. Various memorandun1s and affidavits were
filed by both parties. On June 25, 1956, the lower court
'entered its order denying both motions, holding that
garnishment was an available re1nedy under our rules
for plaintiffs to pursue, and that the issues of bad
faith and negligence could be litigated therein without
the presence of the defendant• under plaintiffs' theory
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that appellant held the excess sum for their use and
benefit as a chose in action of the defendants. The
court set a trial date for the determination of the issues.
This appeal was then taken from that order.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
Subsequent considerations have prompted us not
to include in the brief certain of the points set out in
the petition for an appeal. W'e feel, however, that the
points herein contained are meritorious and will properly
sustain our position.
It is Appellant's contention that the lower court in
denying its motion for summary judgment erred for
the following reasons :

I.
THE ALLEGED CLAIM HERE SOUGHT TO
BE GARNISHED SOUNDS IN TORT AND AS
A MATTER OF LAW IS NOT SUBJECT TO
GARNISHMENT.
II.
UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE
RULE THE ALLEGED CLAIM IS NOT SUBJECT TO GARNISHMENT, SINCE IT IS NOT
IN THE POSSESSION OR IN THE CONTROL
OF A THIRD PERSON.
III.
THE RELATION BETWEEN DEFENDANT
AND GARNISHEE HEREIN IS NOT THAT
OF DEBTOR TO CREDITOR, AND THE
RIGHT OF ACTION EXISTING, IF ANY,
3
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CANNOT BE INTERPRETED AS A DEBT
WITHIN THE LANGUAGE OF RULE 64 (D),
U.R.C.P.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE ALLEGED CLAIM HERE SOUGHT r_ro
BE GARNISHED SOUNDS IN TORT AND AS
A MATTER OF LAW, IS NOT SrBJECT TO
GARNISHMENT.
The claim ltere sought to be garnished is the chose
in action alleged to exist in behalf of the defendant
Kirkendall against the Garnishee, for negligently and
in bad faith refusing to settle within the policy limits
before trial. The defendant has never asserted such
claim. If it is capable of being asserted, it seems without argument that such a claim sounds in tort. It was
argued extensively by Respondent below, and undoubtedly will be argued as extensively here, that the alleged
claim of defendant sounds in contract under the insurance policy, as well as in tort for breach of the duties
arising under such contract. According to our research,
this position is not sustained by the authorities. See
131 A.L.R. 1500, supplementing 71 A.L.R. 1485. The
cases therein cited hold that where an insurer in a
liability policy reserves the exclusive right to contest
or settle any claim against the insured, and prohibits
him from voluntarily assuming any liability for settling
any claims without the insurer's consent, except at his
own cost, (the policy herein involved being substantially
standard in these respects), there is i1uposed upon the
insurer no contract obligation, either express or ilnplied,
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to compromise or settle, and from this it follows that
notwithstanding the insurer's failure or refusal to compromise or settle within the policy limits, no action in
assumpsit or on the contract will lie against it for any
amount that a judgment recovered against the insured
is in excess of the policy limits. Liability, if any, rests
in tort. In Zumwalt vs. Utilities Insurance Company,
Missouri, 228 8. W. 2d 750, which was an action to recover an excess judgment based upon the claim that the
the Company negligently and in bad faith refused to
settle, th'e Court said at Page 756:
"This action is a tort action. It is not an action
to recover 'any loss under a policy' of insurance.
It is true it grew out of a contract, a policy of
insurance. No action on a contract will be against
an insurance company for that part of a judgment recovered against the insured which is in
excess of th'e policy limit. See 131 A.L.R. 1500
and cases therein reviewed."
If the claim sounds in tort therefore, it is subject
to the general rule that such claims are not subject to
garnishment within the purview of statutes generally
in force today. 38 C.J.S. 296; 93 A.L.R. 1088 et seq.
We call attention to the case of Black vs Plumb,
Colorado, 29 Pac. 2nd 708, 91 A.L.R. 1334, and the annotation following at Page 1338. These cases are noted
to be illustrative of the general rule that a mere liability
on the part of the Garnishee to an action by the principal
defendant for conversion of the property of the defendant, will not serve as the basis of a judgment in favor
of the property owner's creditor against the garnishee,
such liability being for an unliquidated tort claim. In

5
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the Black case the Colorado statute provided only for
the garnishment of a credit, debt or chose in action.
Black was an offieer of the defendant corporation
against whom the plaintiff recovered a judgment. It
appeared that Black had sold the use of a list of stockholders of the debtor corporation, thereby converting
it, and the plaintiff by garnishment sought to reach the
proce'eds of the sale. The Supreme Court in reversing
the judgment of the lower court, held that the Garnishee
should have been discharged, since the claim of the
debtor corporation was for conversion, a tort, was unliquidated, and did not fall \vithin the scope of the
statute. In view of the statute, one must necessarily
read this decision as holding that choses in action for
purposes of garnishment must be those arising ex contractu.
The Supreme Court of Georgia in Brena,u College
vs. Mincey, 61 8. E. 2nd 301, held
"It is well settled law in this State that defendant
in a tort action is not subject to garnishn1ent until
the tort claim is reduced to judgment."
Citing Bates and Company cs Forsyth, 69 Georgia
365 (2), to the effect:
"That although one 1nay have the right to bring
a tort action against another, the tort feasor is
not subject to garnishment at the instance of a
creditor of the injured party."
And further :
"Garnishees are required to answer as to indebtedness and as to assets or property in hand,
not as to the torts they 1nay have com1nitted
6
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against the defendant in a suit."
The Suprerne Court of Montana in Coty vs Cogswell, 50 Pac. 2d 249, under its attachment statute (credits,
personal property or debts), held that a chose in action
for personal injury was not property within the purview
of the statute, since it was an unliquidated claim for
damages in tort, and therefore not subject to attachment. S'ee also Arp vs Blake (Cal.) 218 P. 773; Pacific
Gas & Electric Co. v Nakano (Cal.) 87 P. 2d 700, 121
A.L.R. 417; Lewis v. Barnett (Kan.) 33 P. 2nd 331, and
the discusssion in McNeilly v. Furman (Del.) 95 A. 2d
267, 35 A.L.R. 2d 1436.
These cases are collected in the notes and supplement in
38 C.J.S. 296 under Garnishment - Claims Ex Delicto.
E,ven if it were determined that the alleged claim
here involved were dual in nature, giving the person
aggrieved, the right to waive the tort and sue under
the contract, the cases we have been able to find on the
subject nevertheless hold that the creditor of the wronged
person is not at liberty to exercise this option in order
to defeat the principle prohibiting the garnishment of
unliquidated tort claims. 91 A.L.R. 1339, 93 A.L.R.
1088.
POINT II.
UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE
RULE THE ALLEGED CLAIM IS NOT SUBJECT TO GARNISHMENT SINCE IT IS NOT
IN THE POSSESSION OR IN THE CONTROL
OF A THIRD PERSON.
The rule involved, 64 (d) (a), U.R.C.P., insofar
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as material here, provides as follows :
"The plaintiff, at any time after the filing of
the complaint, may have a writ of garnishment
isssue, and attach the credits, effects, debts,
choses in action, money, and other personal property of the defendant in the possession or in the
control of any third person, as garnishee, whether
the same are due at the time of the service of
the writ or are to become due thereafter; • * *."
The claim here, if in fact one exists, is one belonging to and in the possession or control of the defendant himself, and is not held by any third person. It is
or would be a claim by Kirkendall against the Appellant
based upon negligence or bad faith, if any there might
have been.
Mortimer vs Young, California, 127 Pac. 2d 950,
was a case applying similar language under the California statute as it existed at that ti1ne. It involved
levy by execution on a cause of action for fraud. It was
held that a levy on property not capable of manual
delivery, other than a debt, is to be n1ade by giving notice
to the person having such property "in his possession
or under his control'', that person being i·n the case of a
cause of action the plaintiff who is s1u~ng on it.

In Bassett vs McCarty, JT"'ashington, 101 Pac. 2d
575, the garnishment statute provided that the garnishee
shall appear and answer as to what personal property
or effects of the defendant he has in his possession or
under his control. The plaintiff comn1enced an action
against the defendant to recover for Inoney lent and
subsequently he sought to garnish a verdict the defend·
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ant had obtained against a third person. This verdict
was bas'ed upon a cause of action for tort., but had not
yet been reduced to judgment. The court in affirming
the dissolution of the writ of garnishment, held as follows during the course of the opinion at page 579:
"Appellant, however, contends that a verdict
constituted 'property', and for that reason is
subject to garnishment. Rem. Ref. Stat. Sec. 683,
on which appellant relies in this connection, refers to 'personal prop'erty or effects, if any, of
the defendant', which the garnishee 'has in his
possession or under his control, or had when such
writ was served.' (Italics ours)
"Conceding that a claim against the garnishee
constitutes property of th'e claimant, it clearly is
not in the possession, or under the control of,
the garnishee defendant. As stated before, the
question before us is not what constitutes a legal
basis for the issuance of a writ of garnishment,
but specifically, what is subject to garnishment."
See also Cunningham v. Baker (Ala.) 16 So. 68,
which was decided under a garnishment statute embracing, among other things, money or effects in the possession or under the control of a third person. The Garnishee held money and effects of the defendant which
were acquired tortiously. The Court said at Page 71:
"It would be a diversion of a garnishment from
its real office and purposes if it were employed
to redress torts committed against the debtor,
and to reach and subject moneys or effects the
poss'ession of which is not held in his right, but
is held adversely and in hostility to him."
We submit, accordingly, that defendant Kirkendall's
9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

claim or cause of action against Appellant, if any he
had, was not a chose in action "in the possession or in
the control" of appellant and therefore was not subject
to garnishment.
POINT III
THE RELATION BETWEEN DEFENDANT
AND GARNISHEE HEREIN IS XOT THAT
OF DEBTOR TO CREDITOR, AND THE
RIGHT OF ACTION EXISTING, IF ANY,
CANNOT BE INTERPRETED AS A DEBT
WITHIN THE LANGUAGE OF RULE 64 (D),
U.R.C.P.
Plaintiffs, in their answer to Garnishee's petition
for intermediate appeal, and also in their reply to answers of Garnishee, assert that Garnishee is "indebted"
to defendant within the meaning of Rule 64 (d) U.R.C.P.
In this connection, it should be noted that Rule 64 (D)
(a), in outlining what property may be attached by a
Writ of Garnishment, uses the words "debts". The
word "indebted" is used later in Rule 64 (D) (a), in
connection with the requirement of the affidavit for a
writ to issue prior to judgn1ent. Therefore, the word
"indebted" has no bearing in the present question, and
the word "debts" as used in this rule is controlling.
To deter1nine if the alleged right of action existing
between defendant and Garnishee is a "debt", it is necessary to know its exact nature.
The duty·claimed to Jwye be'en breached by garnishee
was (if such a duty is found to exist) a duty in1posed
by law rather than a duty in1posed by contract or agreement of the parties.
In this regard, the provision of the contract of
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insurance here involved is as follows :
"As respects the insurance afforded by the other
terms of this policy under coverages (a) and
(b), the Company shall:
(a) Defend any suit against the insured alleging
such injury, sickness, diseas'e or destruction and
seeking damages on account thereof, even if such
suit is groundless, false or fraudulent; but the
company may make such investigation, negotiation and settlement of any claim or suit as it
deems expedient;"
Under this provision, the Company had the right
or option to make a settlement with plaintiffs, but no
duty to so do. If any duty to settle did exist, it arose,
not by provisions of this contract, but was imposed by
law from the relation of insurer-insured.
The case of City of Wakefield v. Globe Indemnity
Co. (Mich .1929), 225 N.W. 643, is similar in point.
There the insured brought suit against the insurer in
tort to recover an excess judgment rendered against
the insured, upon t:h'e theories (a) negligent defense of
the suit, (b) negligent failure to settle, (c) bad faith
in refusing to settle. While holding that Insurer could
be held liable only on ground (c), the Court said :
"The courts se'em to be unanimous in the opinion,
as expressed by direct ruling, recognition, or
assumption, that the insurer is liable to the insured for an excess of judgment over the face
of the policy when the insurer, having exclusive
control of settlement, fraudulently or in bad faith
refuses to compromise a claim for an amount
within the policy limit. They are also unanirnous

11
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that the instant form of policy contains no express
or implied contract obligation of the insurer to
compromise claims, and that an action in assumpsit or on the contract will not lie for the excess
of judgment over policy limit. Where the proposition is stated, the great weight of authority
holds that the insurer has the option to compromise but no obligation to do so. The exclusive
control of settlement in the insurer, however,
applies only to the policy limit, as the insured
may compromise his own possible liabilitv in
excess of that amount. General Accident, Fire &
Life Assurance Corporation v. Louisville Home
Telephone Co., 175 Ky. 96, 193 S.W. 1031, L.R.A.
1917 D 952; Pickett 1.i. Fidelity & Casualty Co.,
60 S.C. 477, 38 S. E. 160, 629."
In the case of Best Building Co. vs Employer's Liability Assurance Corp. et al, 247 N.Y. 451, 160 N.E. 911,
the insured sued the insurer for alleged negligence in
failure to s'ettle the claim within the policy limits. While
holding the insured to be liable only for bad faith, not
negligence, the Court said:
"The question is directly raised whether under
the terms of these accident policies as they now
read the insurance con1pany is liable for negligence in failing to settle a case when there was
a possibility of so doing. That the insurance
company in the handling of the litigation or in
failing to settle is liable for its fraud or bad
faith is conceded and has been repeatedly stated
in all the cases bearing on the subject. So also
it has been held by this court that the company
is not liable on its contract for a failure to settle;
a contract iluposes upon it no such duty, A uberbach v J.laryland Casualty Co., 236 N.Y. 247, 140
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N.E. 577, 28 A.L.R. 1294; Streat Coal Co. v Frankfort General Ins. Co., 237 N.Y. 60, 142 N.E. 352.
In the latter case this court said: 'Defendant,
however, was privileged at its own cost to settle
any claim or suit. It was not obligated so to do,
neither was it required to consult plaintiff in regard thereto ... In the absence of fraud, negligence or bad faith, alleged and established it is
not the duty of the court to read into contracts
conditions or limitations which the parties have
not assumed' . . ."
The cases above cited hold with the majority of
American courts that the only duty insurer owes insured
in regard to settlement is the duty of good faith. A
minority of courts hold that in addition to the good
faith requirement, the insurer may b'e held liable to
insured if it negligently refuses to settle plaintiff's claim
within the policy limits. This question has never been
decided in this jurisdiction.
However, it does not matter which approach is taken,
because both the "good faith" and "negligence" rules
are founded solely upon a breach of duty implied by
law, not imposed by contract.
Tlre case of Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine,
Accident & Plate Glass Insurance Co. (1917, CA 1st
Mass. 240 F. 573, is on'e of the leading cases adopting
the "negligence" theory. Therein the court said, on
petition for rehearing:
"The defendant's duty to the plaintiff, as set out
in the first and second counts of the declaration,
does not depend upon whether it did or did not
obligate itself in the policy to prepare and defend
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the Hodele suit, or to settle the same. As pointed
out in our opinion handed down in this case on
February 27, 1917, the plaintiff's right of action
in the first count, is based upon the ground that
def·endant entered upon the preparation and defense of the suit, and in the second count that
it entered upon the task of settling it, and that
in each case it was negligent in what it undertook to do. As each count sounds in tort, and is
based upon a duty imposed by la-w, it is wholly
immaterial whether the defendant was or was not
under a contractual duty to prepare and defend
the suit or to settle the same."
It may be urged by plaintiffs that since the original
relation between Garnishee and defendant is contractual, defendant is entitled to waive the tort and sue in
contract for the breach thereof. We submit that such
a result can not be reached because the cause of action
is based solely on tort, as pointed out hereinbefore.
Even if defendant in this instance could waive the
tort and sue in contract, such an option is entirely personal, and does not extend to the plaintiff.
In the case of Black v. Plumb, supra, the court said:
"A clain1 in tort, not reduced the judgn1ent, is
not a debt within the meaning of the statutes in
reference to garnish1nent. • • • The rule is the
same where as between the tort-feasor and the
person to whon1 the wrong was done the latter
might at his option either hold the tort-feasor
to his liability in tort, or, waiving the tort, treat
him as his debtor, since. the creditor of the
wronged person is not at liberty to exercise this
option in his place, and so evade the general
rule as to garnish1nent of clailns in tort, sub-
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stituting thereafter a liquidated claim quasi ex
contractu."

Lewis v. Dubose, 29 Ala. 219, 38 C.J.S. Garnishment Sec. 91, Page 296, 4 Am. J ur. Attachment and
garnishment, Sec. 206 and 207.
In discussing "debt" as pertaining to garnishment statutes, the Supreme Court of Alabama said in
Station Nat. Bank of Decatur at Oneonta v. Towns, 62
So. 2nd 606, at Page 607:
'J::,

"An indebtedness from a garnishee to a judgment debtor subject to garnishment is such debt
as will sustain an action of assumpsit by the
judgment debtor. Coosa Land Co. v. Stradford,
224 Ala. 511, 140 So. 582; Pettus v. Dudley Bar
Co., 218 Ala. 163, 118 So. 153."
Again, in the case of Hollis v. Bender, 40 So. 2nd
876, the Supreme Court of Alabama held:
"With reference to the instant case, if at the time
of the service of the garnishment, or at the time
of making the answer, or at any time intervening
between these dates, tlre garnishee was not indebted to the defendant, York, or if there was
not then existing a valid and binding contract
under the terms of which such indebtedn'ess would
accrue in the future, then there was no debt subject to garnishment. The right thus arising must
have been such demand as would support an
action of debt or indebitatus at the instance of
the debtor. Archer v. Peoples Saving Bank, 88
Ala. 249, 7 So. 53; Henry v. Murphy & Co. 54
Ala. 246; Nicrosi v. Irving, 102 Ala. 648, 15 So.
429, 48 Am. St. Rep. 92; Feore v. Miss. Transp.
Co., 161 Ala. 567, 49 So. 871; Pettus v. Dudley
15
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Bar Co., 218 Ala. 163, 118 So. 153; Coosa Land
Co. v. Stradford, 224 Ala. 511, 140 So. 582; Sloss
v. Glaze, supra; Allen v. Woodruff, 2 Ala. App.
415, 56 So. 247 ..
"Writing on the subject, Chief Justice Stone
observed in Teague, Barnett & Co. v. Legrand,
85 Ala. 493, 5 So. 287, 7 Am. St. Rep. 64: 'True,
the debt need not be due and presently demandable; but there must be a contract, express or
implied, out of which a money liability will ~er
tainly spring in the usual course of things. :Many
contracts from which money liability may possibly arise are not subject to garnishment at
law.' "
The case dealt with a situation where garnishee let
defendant take garnishee's hogs, fatten them, and upon
sale defendant was to receive on'e-half the weight increase. The Court said there was no debt to sustain
garnishment.
Also standing for this interpretation is Tucker r.
Ware (Okla.) 37 P. 2d 625.
Th'e Garnishee herein respectfully submits that
the claim existing, if any there be, between defendant
and garnishee, is a tort claim for drunages which could
not sustain an action of 'debt' or 'indebitatus assumpsit,' and therefore is not a 'debt' within the meaning
of Rule 64D, U. R. C. P.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the remedy of garnishment
cannot have been intended to allow adjudication of a
purely, alleged, tort claim of the defendant against the
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garnishee, the liability for which is expressly denied,
in proceedings solely between garnishor and garnishee.
Such a theory perverts the very purpose of this provisional remedy which historically has been strictly
confined to contract obligations.
The claim here involved is clearly not a debt within
the purview of garnishment. It further cannot be the
subject of garnishment, since it is held, not by a third
person, but by the defendant himself, if in fact it exists.
The order of the lower court should be reversed
and the writ dissolved.
Respectfully submitted,

HOWELL, STINE AND OLMSTEAD
Attorneys for Garnishee and Appellant
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